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Abstract— The vulnerability against interference, spoofing, 
and jamming of GNSS receivers is considered nowadays a major 
security concern. This security threat is exacerbated with the 
existing market availability of GPS jamming and spoofing 
equipment sold at reasonable prices. If jamming is the main issue 
faced at present, spoofing, which allows hijacking someone from 
the expected path, may lead to even worse consequences. Even 
with the latest security measures that are going to be deployed on 
the Galileo PRS signals, GNSS receivers are prone to attacks that 
are relatively easy to implement. In this paper, we identify 
different countermeasures and security schemes that can be used 
against spoofing attacks. These countermeasures include some 
modifications on the GNSS receiver's side, rather than requiring 
modifications of the whole existing GNSS infrastructure. More 
specifically, we propose a detection and protection scheme 
consisting of several statistical tests, based on the computations of 
moving variances of Doppler offset and C/No estimates, together 
with a consistency test of the PVT computation. We evaluate the 
performance of the proposed scheme through simulations and 
using a measurement setup consisting of a Spirent GSS8000 full 
constellation simulator whose output is combined with the one 
from a rooftop GPS antenna before being fed to a receiver front-
end. Finally, we compute the probability of detection and false 
alarm in spoofing detection using the proposed scheme. 
Keywords—Vulnerability, spoofing attacks, countermeasures, 
GPS, Galileo, statistical tests, detection, protection, security.  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The second generation of GNSS (Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems) is almost upon us, with GPS L1-C getting 
ready to be deployed and Galileo just on the horizon. Although 
they bring more advanced signaling features, such as more 
power, pilot channels, and advanced multipath mitigation, OS 
(Open Service) Galileo and GPS signals can also be the target 
of various types of attacks: jamming, spoofing and meaconing 
attacks, as initially described in [1].Therefore, it is becoming 
crucially important to find a way to protect these GNSS 
signals.  
A spoofing attack differs from a jamming one in the sense 
that the objective of the former is just to make the GNSS 
receiver stop working while the latter is to fool the receiver into 
thinking it is in a different (false) position. This position could 
be a few meters off or it could be hundreds of miles off. 
Therefore, even more than jamming, spoofing is an incredibly 
dangerous and threatening form of attack.  As an example, a 
spoofer could be used to broadcast a false location to a GNSS 
receiver in a truck carrying a load of dangerous weapons. The 
spoofer would make the receiver report that it was still on 
track, when in fact the truck could have been stopped and 
stolen.  By the time this is detected, it might be too late [2].  
Spoofing signals can be generated by satellite simulators 
that are available today on the market. Typically, the received 
power of the spoofing signal should exceed that of the 
legitimate signal. The receiver then operates with the forged 
signal as input and computes the location induced by the 
spoofer. Based on a sophistication of the performed spoofing 
attack, three different types of attack can be identified: 
•  Signal synthesizer type: A class of unsophisticated spoofer 
that blindly transmits forged synthesized satellite 
signals, without targeting specific GNSS receivers. For 
example, it could produce the navigation solution it 
wishes to impose, roughly estimating the positions of 
the satellite constellation, and then transmitting forged 
signals towards the GNSS receivers [3]. 
• Meaconing or replay type: Alternatively, spoofed signals 
can be generated based on previously received GNSS 
signals: the adversary records navigation messages and 
retransmits them [1]. 
•  Smart spoofer type: the spoofer first estimates the GNSS 
signal parameters in real-time based on the previously 
received signals, and transmits the newly synthesized 
signals towards the GNSS receiver target. 
The essence of the attacks against commercial GNSS 
receivers lies in the fact that the PRN codes of the satellites are 
publicly known. This allows an adversary to construct and 
transmit GNSS signals identical to those sent by a satellite. The 
objective of the adversary is then be to forge the navigation 
messages, transmit them over an area, and this way manipulate 
the PVT solutions of the GNSS receivers in this area [3]. 
Nonetheless, the adversary should first force its victim GNSS 
receivers to lose their lock on legitimate GNSS signals and 
then re-lock on the adversary's forged. To mount such an 
attack, the adversary should act essentially in two steps. First, it 
should jam the GNSS signals, to force GNSS receivers to lose 
lock with the satellites, and then start transmitting its forged 
messages. The adversary could mount the second and essential 
stage of its attack even without forcing receivers to lose their 
lock to GNSS signals. This would be possible when there are 
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gaps in GNSS coverage, that is, areas where GNSS receiver 
cannot lock onto more than three satellites. This may occur 
often in urban environments and in general due to obstacles 
that cause loss of GNSS signals. 
Signal synthesizer spoofing attacks have the lowest level of 
sophistication. Bogus signals are generated and then broadcast 
towards GNSS receivers inducing confusion about exact 
position and time. This is performed by simply mounting a 
GPS antenna to a GNSS signal simulator and broadcasting 
newly synthesized signals towards GNSS receiver, as shown in 
[3]. Most GNSS signal simulators are heavy and expensive. If 
used in this simplest attack mode, by synthesizing the GNSS 
signal without trying to match the exact satellite constellation 
and signal's parameters, this unsophisticated type of attack can 
be easily detected. This is because of the difficulty of 
synchronizing a simulator's output with the actual GNSS 
signals in its vicinity. An unsophisticated attack effectively acts 
like signal jamming, and may cause the victim GNSS receiver 
to lose lock and perform a partial or complete reacquisition. 
This can be a clear sign of undergoing a spoofing attack. If the 
unsophisticated attack somehow avoids causing a loss of lock, 
it will nonetheless likely cause an abrupt change in the victim 
receiver's GPS time estimate. Jumps in the GNSS receiver 
clock is also a clear sign of an underlying spoofing attack, as 
discussed in [4]. In summary, the ease of mounting such an 
unsophisticated attack via GPS signal simulator makes this 
attack mode relatively likely. Moreover, detecting such an 
attack can be also easily performed, using countermeasures 
based on GNSS signal's statistics that are explained in section 
III. 
The replay or meaconing attack type is based on receiving 
the GNSS signal and replying it with some delay. Even if the 
cryptographic protection of GNSS signals exists, it is still 
possible for an adversary to manipulate the receiver's PVT 
solution, as shown in [5]. The adversary can receive legitimate 
GNSS signals, record them, and transmit them at a later point 
in time and at a different point in space. This is possible 
because, essentially, cryptography ensures the authenticity and 
integrity of messages but cannot ensure signal authenticity: a 
message can be retransmitted by any radio other than the one 
of the message originator. 
Smart spoofing attack is a group of adversarial attacks that 
is usually targeted to individual GNSS receivers, and aims to 
transmit signals with characteristics similar to real satellites. 
One of the challenges that must be overcome to carry out such 
attacks successfully is to know the exact position and velocity 
of the target GNSS receiver antenna. This knowledge is 
required to precisely position the adversarial signals (code 
offset, code and carrier Doppler, etc.) relative to the genuine 
GNSS signals at the target antenna. The smart spoofer needs to 
use directive transmitter antennas to be able to mimic the real 
satellites and spoof multiple GNSS receivers. Therefore, this 
attack requires all of the challenges of mounting a single GNSS 
receiver-spoofer attack, with the additional expense of multiple 
receiver-spoofers and the additional complexity that the 
perturbations to the incoming signals must be phase 
coordinated. One known defense against such an attack is 
cryptographic authentication [4]. Overall, a smart spoofing 
attack via multiple phase-locked portable GNSS receiver-
spoofers is somewhat less likely than an attack via a single 
portable receiver-spoofer, but may be very difficult to detect 
with user-equipment-based spoofing defenses. However, a 
target receiver equipped with a stable reference oscillator and a 
low-drift IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) could resist an 
attack via receiver-spoofer for several hours. In this paper, we 
do not address a smart spoofing adversary, for the explained 
reasons. We further investigate the spoofing defense using 
countermeasures that can provide protection against 
unsophisticated and replay attacks, after presenting the state-of-
the-art in the spoofing protection. 
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART IN SPOOFING PROTECTION 
Prevention of intentional spoofing attacks is a requirement 
for reliable GNSS signaling. Next-generation GNSS (GPS III 
and Galileo) will provide various levels of authenticated 
signaling and message data integrity to civil receivers. Of the 
four projected European Galileo services, Safety of Life (SOL) 
will control access to integrity data through encryption, while 
Public Regulated Services (PRS) and Commercial Services 
(CS) will control access to the signals themselves through 
encrypted ranging codes and navigation data messages. On the 
other hand, Galileo Open Services (OS) as well as existing 
GPS civil signals do not provide authenticated signaling, and 
rely on anomaly detection techniques to identify spoofing. 
These methods have varying levels of success, depending on 
the sophistication of spoofing and detection capabilities. Data 
communications are also unauthenticated and do not provide 
cryptographic integrity protection, allowing spoofing and 
simulation of data messages. Further on, we list the spoofing 
protection schemes that have been proposed until now, and 
discuss their detection success level. 
Many protection solutions against spoofing of GNSS 
receivers have been proposed in the last decade on that front 
[3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]. The purpose of security 
protection techniques is based on providing the integrity of 
transmitted data and also the authenticity of the transmitter 
(satellites). There are clearly two types of signal protection that 
can be used: cryptographic and non-cryptographic protection. 
Cryptographic protection of GNSS signaling can be achieved 
by using data encryption, using either a symmetric or 
asymmetric cryptography scheme. By digitally signing 
broadcast satellite messages, the authentication of GNSS 
signals can be provided, and also serve as protection against 
spoofing attacks. The GNSS receiver simply discards the 
navigation messages whose signature cannot be verified using 
the satellite's well-known public key. Any kind of spoofing 
attack will be hard to implement unless the private key of the 
satellite is known. Unfortunately, this kind of protection is not 
immune against replay attacks [5]. Since the arrival times of 
GNSS signals are important in pseudorange measurements in 
order to obtain an accurate PVT solution, replay attack will 
cause erroneous solution even for cryptographically protected 
GNSS messages. 
A similar solution for GNSS signal protection that is rather 
complex, but could provide a high protection level for GNSS 
receivers is described in [5] and [6]. The concept is based on 
dividing the GNSS navigation message in two parts, one that is 
DSSS modulated by secret spreading codes (SSC), and the 
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other that describes the first one and carries navigation data. 
The first part of the message transmits information about the 
arrival time of GNSS signals, and the second part provides 
information that describes the first part. Using both, the GNSS 
receiver is able to calculate its position and clock offset in a 
way that is immune against attacks. By introducing the first 
part of the message that provides information about the 
propagation time to the receiver, and by detaching this coded 
message from the navigation message, more efficient and 
secure communication can be provided. The first message 
represents the coded part of the message, using the PRN code 
that is not known to GNSS receivers a priori. Therefore, the 
attacker is not able to demodulate and decode GNSS signal 
without the second message. This method can be applied 
without the need to distribute and share any long-term secret 
keys. There is no information available to any GNSS receiver 
that would enable it to attack others. The time difference 
between the two signals should be long enough, so that an 
adversary cannot generate bogus GNSS signals or replay them 
before the arrival of the navigation message. In the moment of 
the navigation message's arrival, both the attacker and the 
GNSS receiver are able to generate the signal that the satellite 
broadcast some time earlier and to detect the exact time of 
arrival of signal. The proposed protection scheme can provide a 
high security level for GNSS receivers, but the disadvantage is 
that it requires the modification of the existing GNSS in order 
to support the different navigation message structure and it 
requires highly synchronized receiver’s clocks. Note that a 
solution that does not require modifications of the existing 
system, and is also based on the navigation messages 
authentication is proposed in [7].  
Non-cryptographic protection usually stands for more 
advanced correlation architectures and advanced tracking 
algorithms for providing security to GNSS signaling. Another 
GNSS spoofing protection method that falls into the group of 
advanced tracking architectures for spoofing protection is 
based on the estimation of signal tracking parameters [8]. It 
uses multipath estimation techniques for spoofing detection, 
based on complex statistical detection tests that are 
computationally and implementation-wise demanding. 
A spoofing protection based on cross-correlation of 
unknown encrypted signals with the existing GNSS signals is 
proposed in [9]. The solution that is proposed is based on 
hypothesis testing theory, and develops a codeless cross-
correlation detection method for use in narrow-band civilian 
GNSS receivers. It was shown that, by using the encrypted 
military GPS P(Y) signal, successful spoofing detection can be 
achieved. The high cross-correlation statistics mean that both 
signals are present in the GNSS receiver, and there is no 
spoofing. If the statistics is low, a spoofing alert is issued. One 
drawback of this technique is the spoofing detection threshold 
dependence on the encrypted and received signal power, and 
for reaching a low false alarm probability, the correlation 
accumulation intervals should be long. 
A straightforward spoofing detection technique based on 
signal power measurements was proposed in [10] and it was 
shown to be effective for verifying the authenticity of the 
received GNSS signals in urban multipath environments, if the 
spoofer signal power is abnormally higher than that of the 
authentic signal when the receiver is in the proximity of the 
standoff spoofer. A suboptimal detector was proposed and a 
statistical analysis was performed to assess the performance of 
the proposed technique. If the average spoofer and authentic 
signal power is known then the detection of spoofing attack is 
trivial. However, if is completely unknown then it has a finite 
optimum, that is, a function of and the type of propagation 
environment detected by the receiver [11] in which an 
expression for computing the optimum was deduced and 
applied to various channels. 
The first step to ensure that the GNSS receiver is locked to 
a legitimate satellite signal is to perform a consistency check 
(PVT solution, frequency and code phase). An example is the 
RAIM (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring) concept 
that is a well-known defense against faulty pseudorange 
measurements [12]. Detecting any mismatch in pseudoranges 
and PVT observable could happen due to an adversary trying to 
deceive the GNSS receiver, or due to the bad satellite data. 
Consistency checking provides the statistical tests for detection 
and exclusion of a single faulty pseudorange measurement. 
Consequently this only provides a single level of protection 
based on pseudorange tests. In case an alarm is raised, the 
GNSS receiver should enter the alert mode, where a number of 
additional consistency checks should be performed. Monitoring 
the signal quality can be performed by using multiple 
correlators to detect anomalies and asymmetries of the 
autocorrelation peak. Monitoring correlation pairs can track the 
autocorrelation peak independently, with different correlator 
spacing and independent tracking loops. Then, the 
autocorrelation peak symmetry test can be performed in the 
pseudorange domain, as proposed in [13].  
In the next section, we describe our GNSS signal protection 
scheme that relies on a non-cryptographic protection concept, 
similarly to the aforementioned principles, but more reliable 
and less complex. 
III. SIGNAL ANOMALIES DETECTOR 
We seek to provide a solution that can protect GNSS 
receivers against the aforementioned spoofing attacks and 
ensure that they can identify signals that are transmitted by an 
adversary. The value of the security scheme we propose lies 
exactly in preventing fraudulent messages from being used and 
thus from manipulating the PVT solution. The approach we 
take relies on monitoring the physical properties of the GNSS 
signals. In fact, the physical characteristics of the GNSS signals 
provide a set of distinctive features that typically differ 
significantly from those pertaining to transmissions from 
adversarial devices. Therefore, we propose an anti-spoofing 
protection scheme based on monitoring the GNSS signal's 
features and performing a detection that relies on statistical 
tests of GNSS signals. The tests are based on ܥ/ ଴ܰ time 
history of all satellite signals and keeping tracks of the ܥ/
଴ܰ  estimation over the time. Based on the ܥ/ ଴ܰ statistics, we 
propose a first detection test formed as a Power Threshold 
Detector (PTD) test. The second test is based on the statistics 
of the carrier Doppler offset change in the form of a Doppler 
Offset Detector (DOD) test. Both tests are integrated in the 
GNSS receiver and perform the spoofer detection based on a 
RAIM-like principle, as well as using the post-processing 
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architecture based on adaptive tracking algorithms. Moreover, 
position and time update consistency tests are performed as 
well in the form of SCT (Signal Consistency Test). 
The received signal analysis is performed on the tracking 
stage, and the decision about further processing of a GNSS 
signal is based on predefined thresholds for the PTD and DOD 
test's statistics and the outcome of the SCT test. The baseband 
model of the GNSS signal ܵ஼ሺݐሻ consisting of n legitimate 
signals and m spoofed signals can be represented as: 
ܵ஼ሺݐሻ ൌ ∑ ܣ௜௡௜ୀଵ ݀௜ሺݐ െ ߬௜ሻܿ௜ሺݐ െ ߬௜ሻ݁௝ଶగ௧௙೏,೔ ൅
                  ∑ ܣ௜௦௠௜ୀଵ ݀௦,௜ሺݐ െ ߬௦௜ሻܿ௜ሺݐ െ ߬௦௜ሻ݁௝ଶగ௧௙೏ೞ,೔ ൅ ߟሺݐሻ  (1) 
where ܣ௜ and ܣ௦ represent the i-th channel gain for the 
legitimate and the spoofed signal, respectively. Similarly, 
݀௜ and ݀௦ represent the data bits for the legitimate and spoofed 
signal, ߬௜ and ߬௦,௜ are the code delays and ௗ݂,௜ and ௗ݂௦,௜ are the 
Doppler frequencies for the i-th channel, corresponding to the 
legitimate signal and spoofing signal, respectively. 
ߟሺݐሻ represents the Gaussian white noise.  
The tests we propose relate to ܣ௜ and ܣ௦, as well as ௗ݂,௜ and 
ௗ݂௦,௜. We further describe the concept of each test before 
showing the performance evaluation in section IV. 
A. Power Threshold Detector (PTD) 
 In the following, we describe the detector based on 
monitoring the change of a satellite’s signal power, which 
involves monitoring and recording the statistics of the ܥ/ ଴ܰ. 
The idea is to estimate the moving variance of the observed 
signal ܥ/ ଴ܰ. For the i-th satellite vehicle, we call it  ܯ ௜ܸሺܹሻ, 
where W is the window size over which the moving variance is 
computed. This value is monitored for all satellites in range. If 
the value exceeds some preset thresholds ݄ܶ௜  defined by the 
GNSS receiver, it should enter the alert mode. This 
countermeasure is based on the idea that relatively 
unsophisticated GNSS spoofing attacks will tend to use 
satellite simulators. Such simulators will typically provide 
signal strengths many orders of magnitude larger than any 
possible satellite signal at the Earth's surface, but at least 3 dB 
above, as has been reported in [14]. In the presence of this test, 
a main difficulty for the spoofer will be to calibrate the incident 
signal power at the GNSS receiver antenna, as it is a function 
of the distance between the spoofer and GNSS receiver and the 
environmental effects, as well as the antenna gain patterns of 
both spoofer and GNSS receiver. If the GNSS receiver 
monitors the signal power level, the only solution for the 
spoofer to deceive it is to have more transceivers, which 
receive and transmit GNSS signals to different users with 
different frequencies and powers. Again, the power level of the 
signal transmitted from the ground propagates and changes 
faster, having different statistics comparing to the signals 
coming from the satellites, that have low variation amplitudes, 
and therefore those attacks can be only targeted to individual 
GNSS receivers. 
 To successfully perform an attack, the adversary has to 
mask valid GNSS signals and pass the PTD test, which means 
generating a signal power according to its distance from the 
GNSS receiver. This confirms that the attack could only 
individually be directed to specific zones and specific GNSS 
receivers. If the attacker has the knowledge of the GNSS 
receiver's position or could track the vehicle in real-time, it 
could adjust the power such that the signal level at the place of 
the attacked receiver matches the expected mean power of the 
signal and deceives it. We identify this attack as the most 
sophisticated (smart spoofer). In the case of the static attacker 
and assuming that the power generated by the attacker has to 
be matched within ௥ܲ௫ଵ and ௥ܲ௫ଶ to defeat the egitimate 
receiver, the area it can control will be limited by a ring with a 
radius ܴଵ ൏ ܴ ൏ ܴଶ, where ܴଵ and ܴଶ are radii of the circles 
shown in Figure 1, that can be determined using the free-space 
propagation model using the minimal and maximal value for 
௥ܲ௫ଵ and ௥ܲ௫ଶ (Note that ௥ܲ௫ଶ needs to exceed the true GNSS 
signals as received at the receiver antenna and ௥ܲ௫ଵ ൐  ௥ܲ௫ଶ). 
 
Figure 1 - Limitation of a zone controllable by an adversary based on a 
power of a signal 
 In order to define a qualitative expression for the success of 
the attack under the PTD scenario, we consider the ratio of the 
surface around the spoofer where the power generated by the 
spoofer and received by the receiver is within ௥ܲ௫ଵ and ௥ܲ௫ଶ, to 
the total surface where the spoofer power is at the minimum 
௥ܲ௫ଶ. Therefore, if only a PTD test is used without considering 
the other protection tests, the success of an attack can be 
estimated as: 
   ݎ ൌ ௌమିௌభௌమ ൌ
ோమమିோభమ
ோమమ
          (2) 
 This ratio can be considered as an upper bound for the 
attacker's success ratio, if we defined it as the ability of the 
attacker to control a certain zone and make the GNSS receivers 
lock onto a spoofed signal. Practically, this ratio depends on 
the movement pattern of the GNSS receiver. We could 
therefore conclude that the improvement over the case without 
a PTD test when the attacker controls the whole zone with the 
radius ܴଶ comparing to the case when the controlled zone is 
limited to the ring marked by radii ܴଵ and ܴଶ, can be computed 
as: 
   ݅ ൌ 1 െ ݎ ൌ ோభమோమమ           (3) 
 As we can observe from Figure 2, where an example of the 
success ratio r of a spoofer is analyzed, the better the ܥ/
଴ܰ estimation, the more surface area can be limited by the PTD 
test. ܴଶ is fixed by the maximal detectable radiated power, 
whereas ܴଵ varies, and at the beginning, the attacker success 
ratio is very high, which corresponds to an attacker able to 
control the whole area, but as soon as the PTD test is applied, 
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the surface an attacker can control decreases, and the success 
rate decreases as well. ܴଵ is initially set to 4000 m at the 
distance from the spoofer, but as it increases, the distance 
between ܴଵ and ܴଶ decreases (ܴଵ becomes ܴଵ ൅ ݔ), and the 
success ratio decreases as well. This is an illustration of how, 
by using the PTD test only, it is possible to detect the spoofing 
attack and decrease the attacker's success rate, but it is clear 
that it also depends on the exact geometry and the equipment 
an attacker possess. 
 
Figure 2 - Attacker success ratio dependence on the surface area bounded 
by ࡾ૚ and ࡾ૛ 
 For a mobile GNSS receiver, the attacker success ratio will 
be even smaller, since there will be some time needed for the 
GNSS receiver to unlock from the satellite due to jamming, 
and then lock to the spoofer’s broadcasts. Therefore, this 
analysis may be regarded as providing us with an upper bound 
for the success of the attack if only PTD is performed. 
 In order to establish the PTD and define the thresholds to 
reliably detect the presence of a spoofing signal, the first step is 
an analysis of the ܥ/ ଴ܰ  statistics when no adversarial signals 
are present. Figure 3 shows the ܥ/ ଴ܰ  computed for tracking 
seven Galileo E1 signals, and computed during the periods of 
400 ms. It can be observed that the variation of the ܥ/ ଴ܰ  is 
relatively stable for the majority of the satellites, not exceeding 
the variation of more than ± 3 dB. This can be better observed 
by computing the moving variance of the estimated ܥ/
଴ܰ  under a window of certain size. 
 
Figure 3 - Estimation graph for C/No for seven satellite vehicles at certain 
moment of time using computation period of 400 ms 
 The moving variance is obtained by computing the variance 
of sets of data and shifting it forward, creating a new subset of 
numbers, computing consequently a new variance. This 
process is repeated over the entire data series. New data set 
consisting of computed variances represents the moving 
variance. The formula for representing analytically the moving 
variance is the following [16]: 
ߪெ௏ଶ ൌ ଵௐ ∑ ൣݔሺ݇ሻ െ ݔሺ݊ሻതതതതതത൧
ଶ௡௞ୀ௡ିௐାଵ െ ݔሺ݊ሻതതതതതത ൌ ݔଶሺ݊ሻതതതതതതതത െ ݔሺ݊ሻതതതതതത  
(4) 
ݔሺ݊ሻതതതതതത corresponds to the average of the subset values, ݔଶሺ݊ሻതതതതതതതത is 
the sum of the squares over the number of samples in the 
subset W, and n is the subset number. We used a window of 
size W = 100 ሺܥ/ ଴ܰ െsamples), that corresponds to a time-
frame of 400 ms. Any change in the ܥ/ ଴ܰ  variation is easily 
detectable using the moving variance principle. This can be 
observed from Figure 4, where the moving variance for five 
satellite signals is plotted, as well as for a ground spoofer's 
signal, generated using the Spirent GSSS8000 simulator. In 
order to simulate this spoofed signal, we positioned one 
satellite simulating spoofer very close to the Earth, such that 
the power variation due to the movement can be clearly 
detected.
 
Figure 4 - Moving variance of C/No for five satellite vehicles and a 
spoofer using variance computation window of 400 ms 
 Previous papers that were considering estimation of the 
signal power in order to form the spoofing test were based on 
the absolute power estimation and its statistics, such as the 
works presented in [10] and [11]. We took different approach, 
consisting in the computation of the moving variance of the 
power estimation that is a metrics much more sensitive on the 
change between the transition between the legitimate and a 
spoofing signal. Therefore, its statistics and probability 
distribution is different as well, as it will be shown later in 
section VI.  
 The advantage of the legitimate GNSS satellite signals is 
that their ܥ/ ଴ܰ  variation is low, due to the great GNSS 
receiver-satellite distance. On the contrary, the spoofer is 
located on the ground close to the GNSS receiver's antenna, 
and if mobile, variation of the ܥ/ ଴ܰ  will have different 
distribution and its moving variance will have high peaks, 
several orders of magnitude higher than the legitimate 
satellites. We can observe in this example that, by setting the 
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threshold for moving variance ܯ ௧ܸ௛ = 3 ݀ܤଶ െ ܪݖଶ, spoofing 
signals could be easily detected and mitigated. 
 A main problem with the PTD test that may arise is the 
varying multipath environments, in which case the signal 
power can vary depending on the multipath pattern 
superimposed to the GNSS signal. Consequently, the analysis 
considered here does not assume a severe multipath 
environment, and considers static and dynamic scenarios with 
clear LOS between the satellites and GNSS receiver, as well as 
between the spoofer and the GNSS receiver. 
B. Doppler Offset Detector (DOD) 
The second spoofing detection test we propose is based on 
previously received GNSS signal's Doppler offset, that relates 
to the change in carrier frequency with respect to the nominal 
transmitter frequency ( ௖݂ = 1575.42 MHz). The Doppler shift 
is produced due to the relative motion of the satellites with 
respect to the GNSS receiver. The satellite velocity can be 
computed using ephemeris information and an orbital model 
available at the receiver [14]. The received frequency, 
௥݂  increases as the satellite approaches and decreases as it 
recedes from the receiver, and it can be approximated by the 
classical Doppler equation:        
 
௥݂ ൌ ௖݂ ቀ1 െ ௔௩ೝ௖ ቁ          (5) 
 
where ௖݂ is the nominal (transmitted) frequency, ௥݂ the 
received frequency, ݒ௥  the satellite-to-user relative velocity 
vector, and c the speed of light. The product ܽݒ௥  represents the 
radial component of the relative velocity vector along the line-
of-sight to the satellite. As the GNSS carrier frequency is high 
and the satellites velocities are large, large Doppler offsets are 
produced within the range of ± 5 kHz, and vary rapidly. If the 
oscillator of the GNSS receiver has a frequency shift of ± 5 
kHz, the resultant frequency shift may go up to ± 10 kHz. The 
rate of Doppler offsets' receiving frequency caused by the 
relative movement between satellite and vehicles is 
approximately 40 Hz per minute at the maximum for a static 
GNSS receiver and can be assumed linear [15]. If the receiver 
is mobile, the Doppler shift variation can be estimated 
knowing the velocity of the receiver and the direction 
(altitude). 
Interestingly, keeping track of Doppler offsets can indicate 
the beginning of a spoofing attack, when an adversary is trying 
to make the GNSS receiver lock onto the false signal. If a 
DOD test is performed during the tracking, the adversary 
signals can be eliminated before the navigation message is 
decoded. For the static GNSS receiver, the Doppler offset can 
be assumed changing according to a linear model if the 
receiver's clock is stable. If the Doppler offset for each 
satellite vehicle ܵ ௜ܸ differs more than the statistically-
computed thresholds defined a priori in the range 
ሺ߂ ௠݂௜௡, ߂ ௠݂௔௫ሻ, the GNSS receiver can deem the received 
signal as the result of an attack. Moreover, the GNSS receiver 
can still predict the Doppler offset while the GNSS signals are 
unavailable using the linear prediction model. Once the lock to 
the GNSS signals is re-established, estimated Doppler offsets  
 
Figure 5 - Moving average of Doppler offset observable for window sizes 
of 1, 100 and 1000 
can be compared to the received ones. If the latter exceeds a 
threshold, the GNSS signal is deemed adversarial and rejected.  
What make this approach attractive are the smooth 
changes of Doppler offset and the ability to predict it with 
low, essentially constant errors over long periods of time. 
Figure 5 shows the Doppler offset variation when tracking 
SV 5 using RF samples collected from a Spirent GSS8000 
simulator [17] connected to a Fraunhofer front-end [18] and 
processed in software: the maximum change in rate of Doppler 
offset is within ± 20 Hz around a linear curve fitted to the 
data. This shows that with sufficient samples, the Doppler 
offset rate can be estimated. The example stands for a static 
GNSS receiver. Using the window of a Doppler offset 
observable, and computing the moving average over the time 
window, a lower Doppler offset's variation is achieved along 
with a smoother transition to the next state, and therefore 
higher sensitivity can be achieved in Doppler offset change.  
The variance across the Doppler offsets in a window of a 
certain size, so-called moving variance, can provide a 
detection of any changes in the Doppler offset statistics. 
Figure 6 shows the moving variance of Doppler offsets for 
window sizes of 100, 500, and 1000 samples. We can observe 
that the moving variance does not exceed 30 Hz for a window 
size greater than 100. Statistical analysis showed that even 
with smaller window sizes (10 samples), and considering all 
satellites in view, it does not exceed 40 Hz 90 % of the time. 
Therefore, setting the threshold for the moving variance to this 
value as it is done for the PTD test can provide a reliable 
detection indicator for the onset of a spoofing attack. 
Moreover, once the alert for the spoofing attack based on the 
moving variance threshold detector is issued, prediction of 
Doppler offset based on a linear prediction model can provide 
the GNSS receiver with approximate Doppler offset to 
continue tracking. 
If a static GNSS receiver scenario is considered, the future 
Doppler offset samples (ܦሺݐሻതതതതതത) can be predicted using the 
previous n samples of ܦሺݐሻ using the linear prediction model 
as: 
ܦሺݐሻതതതതതത ൌ ∑ ܽ௜௡௜ୀଵ ܦ௡ିଵሺݐሻ                               (6) 
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Figure 6 - Moving variance of Doppler offset for different window sizes 
(100, 500 and 1000) and static and dynamic scenario 
The future Doppler offset samples are predicted based on the 
previous sample history, and are computed as a weighted 
linear combination of past n samples using the weight ܽ௜. 
Weights ܽ௜ are selected to minimize the mean square error 
(MSE) between ܦሺݐሻ and ܦሺݐሻതതതതതത. The error to minimize ݁௠ is 
given as: 
݁௠ ൌ ܧ ቂ൫ܦሺݐሻ െ ܦሺݐሻതതതതതത൯ଶቃ ൌ ܧሾሺܦሺݐሻ െ ∑ ܽ௜ܦ௡ିଵሺݐሻ௡௜ୀଵ ሻሿଶ      (7) 
Solution of this set of equations provides values for 
coefficients ܽ௜. The obtained equations are Yule - Walker 
equations, and though there are many efficient algorithms that 
solve this set of equations, one of them is the algorithm 
developed by Levinson and Durbin [19]. Note that each 
satellite has different velocity dynamics and therefore the 
linear prediction coefficient should be separately computed. 
Nonetheless, this does not affect the ability of the receiver to 
distinguish between real and false satellite signals with help of 
DOD test.  
Also, the accuracy of the linear prediction model does not 
need to be very high, since the Doppler offset mostly depends 
on satellite velocity (that is in the range of ± [1-5] km/s), and 
the contribution of the ground receivers is minor. A spoofer 
would need to match the Doppler offset of every satellite 
signal, for which he would need multiple antennas, and 
multiple transmitters (one per channel), if not in possession of 
complex, expensive, and relatively bulky full constellation 
simulators that can generate multiple channels at the same 
time on the same antenna. 
The principle of using a linear model for the Doppler offset 
prediction is shown in Figure 7. Based on the history of 
Doppler offsets for each satellite, the linear prediction model 
computes the future estimates of the future Doppler offset. 
The DOD prediction test therefore consists in performing a 
comparison of the estimated and upcoming samples of 
Doppler offset and checking if they are inside the limits 
estimated with 95 % confidence. If this is fulfilled, the normal 
operation of the GNSS receiver is performed. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Doppler offsets prediction based on the linear regression model 
for the dynamic scenario 
C. GNSS Signal Consistency Tests (SCT) 
The need to provide continuous navigation between the 
update periods for GNSS receivers (which essentially are 
discrete-time position/time sensors with sampling interval of 
approx. one second or 10 Hz), has already led to the use of 
inertial sensors, altimeters, speedometers, odometers to 
calculate GNSS receiver location [3]. However, the accuracy 
of such sensors degrades with time, and the cost is high for 
commercial instantiations of GNSS receivers. Therefore, as an 
enhancement in spoofing detection already discussed, we 
propose to use GNSS signal consistency check test, which we 
group in a single test as SCT. It is based on the consistency in 
location and time update, ephemeris data and pseudorange rate 
change, as well as clock offset change. 
 
The cross-checking tests of the GNSS signal observables on 
which the SCT is relying upon are the following: 
 
• If the reception of GNSS signals is disrupted, the 
local oscillator switches from normal to holdover 
mode, with timing accuracy depending on the 
stability of the local oscillator. The quartz crystals of 
different clocks might be running at slightly different 
frequencies, causing the clock values to gradually 
diverge from each other (skew error). To enable such 
a scheme, the behavior of quartz clocks is important, 
and in particular the period during which the receiver 
can maintain coarse synchronization. A simulation 
based study [20] of quartz clocks claims that coarse 
time synchronization can be maintained at 
microsecond accuracy without GPS reception for 350 
s in 95 % of cases. This means that a quartz oscillator 
can maintain millisecond synchronization for a few 
hours, including random errors and temperature 
change induced inaccuracies. If we define limits for 
the computed minimal and maximal time offsets after 
establishing the lock again, ߬௠௜௡ ൏ ߬ ൏ ߬௠௔௫ , it is 
possible to reject spoofed signals after losing lock 
with the satellite and again locking by comparing if 
the time shift τ satisfies the established bounds. 
1264
• The received ephemeris data that is used for satellite 
position computation is compared with previous 
ephemeris history records, as well as almanac data to 
ensure that the computed satellite positions are not 
too far away from the expected position provided by 
the almanac. The almanac contains approximate 
positions of the satellites in the specific moment in 
time. From the almanac, information about the set of 
available satellites that are expected to be at the sky 
is given by ሼܵ ௜ܸሽ, ݅ ൌ 1, … , ݊ (n is the satellite vehicle 
number). This information is important, since, if the 
set of satellites that is being searched ൛ܵ ௝ܸൟ, ݆ ൌ 1, ݇, 
does not match the former expected set, or the 
number of observed satellites is less or larger than the 
number of expected ones (k < n or k > n), this could 
be the sign of an attack, and the signals from the 
spoofer can be detected and eliminated. 
 
• The GNSS receiver should be able to keep track of its 
location and time information and detect abrupt 
changes during the navigation, and also any 
inconsistency detected (such as large offsets in 
position and time between two update periods). If any 
of these is detected, the GNSS receiver navigation 
switches to an alert mode. 
 
• The pseudorange rate, defined as the rate the 
pseudorange changes in between two update period is 
constantly checked and monitored. Any abrupt 
change in the pseudorange rate function can be a sign 
of the spoofing attack as well. 
D. Spoofing Detection and Protection Scheme 
As discussed above, the countermeasures we consider here 
rely on information the GNSS receiver obtained before the 
onset of an attack, or more precisely, before the suspected 
onset of an attack, and include:  
• SCT test, calculated from GNSS navigation 
messages, 
• PTD test, detecting the variation of GNSS signal 
power (ܥ/ ଴ܰ ) 
• DOD test, based on received GNSS signal Doppler 
offset measurements.  
We propose the integration of a separate and independent 
module in the GNSS receiver chain, whose role is to perform 
the proposed statistical tests. This spoofing detection and 
protection module (SDP) is an integral part of the GNSS 
receiver after signal the down-conversion of GNSS signal to 
IF, that have direct access to IF data input stream. The 
detection and protection scheme relies on the receiver-
autonomous monitoring of GNSS signal parameters. The 
protection scheme based on SDP assumes several protection 
levels, and is illustrated in Figure 8. It is a complex processing 
unit, capable of performing the detection tests on the incoming 
GNSS signals, containing enough memory to keep the history 
of the GNSS signal's statistics, and able to provide a high 
probability of detection and protection against spoofing. 
 
Figure 8 - Spoofing detection and protection (SDP) scheme 
The SDP module is integrated in the channel tracking stage, as 
a part of the adaptive tracking algorithm, as well as navigation 
and positioning stage. After down-conversion, RF samples are 
fed into the tracking module, that successfully tracks the 
existing satellite channels, and provides tracking results to the 
post-processing block, that keeps tracks of the GNSS signal 
statistic's history, in order to compare it to the upcoming data, 
and prompt the decision about further processing. ܥ/
଴ܰ  estimation and Doppler offset estimation is performed 
during the tracking, in order to detect the signals coming from 
untrusted sources. PTD and DOD tests are then performed, 
and based on the outcome, if any of the tests causes the alert to 
turn 'ON', processing immediately switches to protection 
mode. Protection mode uses statistical data of Doppler offset 
and GNSS signal power, and performs a further check if the 
tracking can be continued. This is performed using a 
prediction module. If tracking cannot be established, 
processing transits to re-acquisition, where the GNSS receiver 
prompts to acquire the same GNSS satellites it was tracking 
before, and establishes the lock again. If both tests are correct, 
navigation can be normally performed. The consistency check 
unit shown in Figure 8 is active all the time, performing the 
abovementioned SCT test.  
We further test the proposed detection and protection 
scheme using a realistic setup described further on, and show 
its robustness against three types of spoofing attacks. 
IV. ATTACK IMPLEMENTATION AND PROTECTION 
Different architectures to implement jamming and spoofing 
attacks are possible. These architectures can be split into two 
main categories as shown in Figure 9 and described below: 
• Adversarial signals are mixed with legitimate 
signals at GNSS antenna before they are processed 
(Option I). 
• Adversarial signals are mixed with legitimate 
signals at baseband (Option II). 
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Figure 9 - Two different architectures for attack implementation 
The first solution (Option I) is closer to a real world 
scenario, where both legitimate and adversarial signals pass 
through each stage of the GNSS receiver. The second solution 
(Option II) is easier to implement and simulate because it 
involves only software operations, and the signals are mixed in 
baseband. The advantage of mixing the signals after the front-
end stage is that it allows for starting the simulations with 
different parameters that are easily configured andthe 
evaluation of the proposed countermeasures can be performed 
promptly. The disadvantage is the assumption that the 
adversarial signals have already passed the front-end stage, 
including the automatic gain control (AGC). We implemented 
both solutions for our analysis. However, in the scope of this 
paper, the results are only shown using Option I that is more 
realistic.  
V. SPOOFING DETECTION AND PROTECTION RESULTS  
Several experiments were carried out to show the resistance 
and reliability of the proposed spoofing protection scheme. The 
unsophisticated spoofing attacks, such as the ones that do not 
take into account the exact position and parameters of a GNSS 
receiver are straightforward to detect and reject. The smart 
spoofer, as we define it, is a spoofer that has the access to the 
real-time position of a GNSS receiver under the attack, and is 
in the vicinity of a GNSS receiver able to transmit GNSS 
satellite signals that are harder to detect and reject. For the 
experiments performed here, we assume the implementation of 
three different types of a smart spoofer that is exclusively 
based on the replay attack concept: 
• Static spoofer, randomly generating and 
transmitting satellite signals over the air in the 
area of a GNSS receiver (type I). 
• Static spoofer, able to receive and re-transmit in 
real-time GNSS signals from multiple 
transmitters, each corresponding to one satellite 
signal (type II). 
• Static smart spoofer, able to receive and transmit 
in real-time signals from multiple transmitters 
towards a mobile GNSS receiver in a car moving 
in an urban area, each corresponding to one 
satellite signal (type III). 
The simulation set-up we use consists of a Spirent 
GSS8000 simulator [17] that emulates the real satellite 
constellation, combined with signals coming from our GPS 
rooftop antenna, emulating the spoofer, in a way that is shown 
in Figure 10. Tests we perform for spoofing detection are 
separately shown in a SDP module, that continuously monitors 
the signal parameters, and based on the outcome of the PTD, 
DOD and SCT tests, issues an alert and switches to protection 
mode in case of spoofing detection. 
 
Figure 10 - Spoofing measurement setup including detection and 
protection unit 
The outcomes from the proposed PTD and DOD tests for the 
Spoofer type I are shown in Figure 11 for satellite SV 14. It is 
obvious that by performing the two proposed tests, the spoofer 
of this type can be detected and an alert issued in further 
processing. DOD test is straightforward, since there is a clear 
shift in the received Doppler for more than 100 Hz, whereas 
the PTD test has a lower detection probability, since the power 
of both signals is similar, as the spoofer tries to match the 
estimated signal power. In another example, shown in Figure 
12, the spoofer tries to match the Doppler of a GNSS receiver, 
but has higher amplitude variations, which is easily detectable 
by a PTD test. Based on the thresholds for PTD and DOD tests 
set to 2 ݀ܤଶ െ ܪݖଶ and 400 ܪݖଶ respectively, the attack can 
be successfully detected and mitigated (in both examples, a 
window of 10 samples is used for the computation of the 
moving variance). According to Figure 8, the receiver 
switches to prediction mode, where the tracking loops are re-
initialized to the code delay and carrier offset before the 
spoofing started. Further protection consists in a comparison 
of the received and predicted Doppler offset and ܥ/ ଴ܰ  , based 
on the GNSS signal tracking history, and deciding about 
further processing. 
 
Figure 11 - Detection of spoofing: PTD and DOD tests for Spoofer Type I 
using window size of W = 10 
One of the tests in the SDP scheme shown in Figure 8 in the 
navigation stage is the SCT test, which consists in keeping  
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Figure 12 - Detection of spoofing: PTD and DOD tests for Spoofer Type I 
using window size of W = 10 
tracks of the continuous and smooth update of the position, 
time and pseudorange rate. Any abrupt changes of these that 
the GNSS receiver detect in real-time can be due to the signals 
coming from untrustful sources and should be rejected. 
Position offset caused by the Spoofer Type I for the previous 
example is shown in Figure 13. There is an abrupt change in 
the position update a couple of hundred meters away from the 
legitimate position, easily detectible by the SCT test. 
 
Figure 13 - Position change of the Spoofer Type I 
Depending on the outcome of the DOD, PTD and SCT 
tests, the GNSS receiver is able to bring the decision about the 
navigation based on the decision logic shown in Figure 8. It 
could happen that one of the proposed tests fails, but because 
of the complexity of the protection scheme the probability of a 
false alarm for all tests and all satellites used for navigation is 
very small, as we further show in section VI. Outcomes of the 
DOD and PTD tests for a spoofer Type II are shown in Figures 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 for five satellites in view. In this case, 
it is assumed that the spoofer possesses high-gain antennas, and 
multiple transmitters (one for each satellite). It is important to 
notice that the spoofing starts at the same moment for all 
satellites, and that the spoofing detection is positive for all 
satellite channels, although there is a difference in detection 
success of individual channels. 
 
 
Figure 14 - Detection of spoofing: DOD test and its variance for Spoofer 
Type II 
 
Figure 15 - Detection of spoofing: PTD test and its variance for Spoofer 
Type II 
Finally, the third test with a mobile GNSS spoofer is 
considered (Type III), where the Doppler offset changes fast, 
due to the fast-changing velocity and direction change of the 
GNSS receiver. In this case, a lower window size should be 
used when computing the moving variance, to that the 
detection scheme will be more sensitive to change of a signal 
statistics. 
Experimental evaluation showed that a considerable 
window size in order to achieve good detection is W=10 
samples for the mobile scenario, and W=100 samples for the 
static GNSS receiver. These are the values for the window size 
that we used here. 
The detection ability of the proposed scheme is tested for 
spoofing a mobile GNSS receiver with a static smart spoofer, 
located in the area and receiving the signal from the same set 
of satellites, re-distributing them over the spoofing area where 
the mobile GNSS receiver is located. In this case, Doppler 
offset depends on the exact trajectory of a mobile GNSS 
receiver, and its velocity change.  
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DOD test outcome for the GNSS mobile receiver moving to a 
simple rectangular pattern is shown in Figure 16. Although the 
Doppler offset changes continuously, DOD test was able to 
detect the spoofing signal, whose moving variance exceeds the 
threshold as can be seen in the second set in the same figure 
(staring at time 60 s). 
Similar results were obtained using a PSD test, noting that 
when the attack begins, the usually estimated power drops, 
and then increases to more than it was before the onset of the 
attack, as can be observed from Figure 17. Also, if we have a 
closer look on the trajectory of a mobile receiver, we could 
notice that it contains high jumps in the estimated position, as 
can be seen from Figure 18. The red line is a trajectory of the 
GNSS receiver, and the green trajectory is a trajectory of the 
GNSS receiver under spoofing.  Therefore, it is clear that by 
using PTD and DOD together with the SCT test, it is possible 
to detect the spoofer with a high probability, and switch to 
alert processing mode, based on which outcome further 
processing is performed.  
 
Figure 16 - Detection of spoofing: DOD test and its variance Spoofer Type 
III 
 
 
Figure 17 - Detection of spoofing: PTD test and its variance for Spoofer 
Type III 
 
Figure 18 - Position change of the Spoofer Type III 
Using this procedure, the spoofer’s signals can be successfully 
detected, and, in a high percentage of cases, mitigated, as it is 
shown further. 
After presenting these results for the proposed tests, and 
showing that they can be used reliably for the spoofing 
detection and protection, we further perform a theoretical 
analysis of the spoofing detection using a probabilistic 
approach.  
VI. SPOOFER PROTECTION RELIABILITY 
Spoofing detection and protection described and evaluated 
in the previous sections are based on performing several 
statistical tests and depending on their outcome, either 
accepting the received signals for further processing and 
navigation, or rejecting them, further switching to the recovery 
procedure. Therefore, the spoofing detection algorithm is based 
on a comparison of the received Doppler and power with the 
set of pre-defined thresholds and can be seen as a binary 
detection problem, deciding between the two hypotheses, the 
authentic signal hypothesis (ܪ଴), and the spoofing signal 
hypothesis (ܪଵ), as shown in Figure 19. Note that the 
thresholds are set based on the authentic signal and the noise 
statistics as it has been described in [21]. Therefore, the 
statistics of a spoofer signal are not needed. 
As already explained in section III.D, the GNSS receiver is 
recording the GNSS signal's statistics, especially of the 
Doppler offset and ܥ/ ଴ܰ estimation, and performing the 
proposed tests on whose basis the detection is performed. The 
GNSS receiver records N signal samples (n=1,...N) and bounds 
them to one of the two hypotheses: 
ܪ଴: ݔ௡ ൌ ׬ ቀ∑ ܣ௜௡௜ୀଵ ݀௜ሺݐ െ ߬௜ሻܿ௜ሺݐ െ ߬௜ሻ݁௝ଶగ௧௙೏,೔ ൅௡்ሺ௡ିଵሻ்
                           ߟሺݐሻቁ ݀ݐ   ؆  ∑ ݏ௜௔௡௜ୀଵ ൅ ߦ௔                (8) 
ܪଵ: ݔ௡ ൌ ׬ ቀ∑ ܣ௜௦௡௜ୀଵ ݀௦,௜൫ݐ െ ߬௦,௜൯ܿ௜൫ݐ െ ߬௦,௜൯݁௝ଶగ௧௙೏ೞ,೔ ൅௡்ሺ௡ିଵሻ்
                          ߟሺݐሻቁ ݀ݐ ൅  ׬ ቀ∑ ܣ௜௡௜ୀଵ ݀௜ሺݐ െ ߬௜ሻܿ௜ሺݐ െ௡்ሺ௡ିଵሻ்
                           ߬௜ሻ݁௝ଶగ௧௙೏,೔ ൅ ߟሺݐሻቁ ݀ݐ   ؆  ∑ ݏ௜௦௠௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ݏ௜௔௡௜ୀଵ  ൅ ߦ௦   
       (9) 
where ݏ௜௔ and ݏ௜௦ represent authentic and spoofed signals, 
respectively, and ߦ௔, ߦ௦ are the noise components. 
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A detection variable ݒ ൌ ܥ௧௛ ሺݕሻ, where y represents the 
moving variance of variable ݔ௡ , can be formulated to decide 
between the two hypotheses, ܪ଴ or ܪଵ, comparing y with the 
set of pre-defined thresholds  ( ஽ܶை஽ , ௉்ܶ஽, ௌܶ஼்), related to the 
DOD, PTD and SCT tests, respectively. A decision based on y 
can be found from the probability density function (pdf) of the 
moving variance of the proposed tests. Since the hypothesis 
outcome depends on several tests that have a different 
probability density function, we assume then can be considered 
as independent.  
 
Figure 19 - Binary hypotheses for the authentic and spoofing signal with 
the corresponding probabilities 
Condition ܥ௧௛ is the condition that performs the check if the 
y is smaller than pre-defined threshold for each test: 
ܥ௧௛ ൌ ൫ሺݕ஽ை஽ ൏ ஽ܶை஽ሻܣܰܦሺݕ௉்஽ ൏ ௉்ܶ஽ሻܣܰܦሺݕௌ஼் ൏ ௌܶ஼்ሻ൯  
                     (10) 
The detection variable v is bound to the binary test of ܪ଴ 
versus ܪଵ in the following form: 
  ݒ ൌ ൜ 1ሺܪ଴ሻ, ܥ௧௛ ݅ݏ ݐݎݑ݁ 0ሺܪଵሻ, ܥ௧௛ ݅ݏ ݂݈ܽݏ݁         (11) 
Therefore, the condition to detect hypothesis ܪ଴ that marks 
the authentic signal state is to have the detection variable y less 
than the set of pre-defined thresholds. If any of the conditions 
from equation (10) is not fulfilled, hypothesis ܪ଴ is declared as 
false, and the algorithms switches to hypothesis ܪଵ , declaring 
a spoofing state. Probability of detection ுܲబ is defined as the 
probability that detection variable declares the authentic signal 
state. Probability of misdetection ுܲభబ ൌ 1 െ ுܲబ can be 
computed as the probability that ܪ଴ is declared and the GNSS 
receiver is in a spoofing state. They can be expressed as: 
  ுܲబ ൌ ܲሺݒ ൌ 1|ܪ଴ሻ        (12) 
   ுܲభబ ൌ 1 െ ܲሺݒ ൌ 1|ܪ଴ሻ         (13) 
Probability of error or probability of false alarm can be 
computed as the probability that the receiver is in a spoofing 
state, but ܥ௧௛  is true and ܪ଴ is accepted: 
 ௙ܲ௔ ൌ ܲሺݒ ൌ 1|ܪଵሻ ൌ 1 െ ܨ௩|ுబ ൌ ׬ ௩݂|ுబஶ௬ ሺݕሻ݀ݕ        (14) 
௩݂|ுబis the pdf of each individual test, and ܨ௩|ுబ the cumulative 
distribution function. Since the pdf  of each test might not be 
the same, in order to compute the probability of error, we have 
to define the pdf of each test, and then compute the final false 
alarm error probability using equation (14). Assuming that the 
spoofing detection tests are independent, the final false alarm 
error probability can be computed as: 
௙ܲ௔ ൌ ௙ܲ௔஽ை஽ · ௙ܲ௔௉்஽ · ௙ܲ௔ௌ஼்         (15) 
௙ܲ௔஽ை஽, ௙ܲ௔௉்஽ and  ௙ܲ௔ௌ஼் represent the false alarm probabilities for 
DOD test, PTD test and SCT test, respectively. 
 
Figure 20 - PDF of Doppler offsets moving variances for Type III 
example using window size of W=10 
 
Figure 21 - CDF of Doppler offsets moving variances for Type III 
example using window size of W=10 
pdf and cdf (cumulative distribution function) of Doppler offset 
moving variance for the group of satellites used in the example 
of Type III, shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17 is shown in 
Figure 20 and Figure 21, respectively. Distribution of Doppler 
offset moving variance for a window size of W=10 is log-
normal, ࣨሺߤ, ߪଶሻ, therefore expressions for pdf and cdf can be 
written as in [19]: 
݌݂݀ሺݔሻ ൌ 1ݔߪ√2ߨ ݁
ିሺ୪୭୥ሺ௫ሻିఓሻమ/ଶఙమ  
   ݂ܿ݀ሺݔሻ ൌ ଵଶ ൅
ଵ
ଶ ݁ݎ݂ ൤
୪୬ ሺ௫ሻିఓ
ඥଶఙమ ൨       (16) 
When deciding about the threshold for the moving variance 
of Doppler offsets, the maximal value of the mean (μ) of the 
distribution in normal conditions is considered, and the mean 
during spoofing, as well as the value for the threshold is 
decided based on criterion that the detection success is higher 
than 99 %. Considering the satellite set from Type III example, 
and based on the described computation scheme, the threshold 
for the Doppler offset moving variance using window size of 
10 is ஽ܶை஽=80 and is taken from Figure 21. For this threshold 
value, mean false alarm probability is ௙ܲ௔ଵ ൌ 1 െ ܨ௩|ுబ ൌ
1.6825 · 10ିସ. 
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Figure 22 - PDF of C/No moving variances for Type III example using 
window size of W=100 
 
Figure 23 - CDF of C/No moving variances for Type III example using 
window size of W=100 
Variation of ܥ/ ଴ܰ when no interference, multipath, or other 
sources of disturbance are present is also considered in order to 
decide about the pdf and cdf, shown in Figure 22 and Figure 
23. The distribution of moving variance of ܥ/ ଴ܰ estimates is 
also log-normal, with the corresponding means and variances 
for this specific case also shown in Figure 22 and Figure 23. 
pdf curves of ܥ/ ଴ܰ estimates match the log-normal probability 
distribution very well, and in a similar way as for the DOD test 
analysis, we determined the threshold for the PTD test, ௉்ܶ஽= 
0.2. The false alarm probability for this threshold is ௙ܲ௔ଶ ൌ 1 െ
ܨ௩|ுబ ൌ 1.3499 · 10ିସ. 
We can observe that by taking into consideration only DOD 
and PTD test, the overall mean false alarm probability using 
equation (15) can be computed. The SCT test probability 
analysis is not taken into consideration since it is not so easy to 
estimate its distribution since there are no statistical tests used 
in this case, and we could not perform a similar analysis as we 
did for PTD and DOD tests. Taking computed false alarm 
probabilities for PTD and DOD tests, the overall false alarm 
probability using only DOD and PTD tests is computed as 
௙ܲ௔ ൌ ௙ܲ௔ଵ · ௙ܲ௔ଶ ൌ 2.2713 · 10ି଼. As we can observe, this 
probability is very small, which means that the spoofing 
detection probability is very high using only PTD and DOD 
tests. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we discussed the vulnerability of the existing 
GPS and upcoming Galileo navigation system against typical 
spoofing attacks. It was shown that the replay attack is the 
most dangerous attack type. We identified and listed many 
solutions proposed for secure GNSS signaling, the majority of 
them being based on modification of the existing navigation 
system, or requiring complex implementations. After that, we 
proposed a simple solution that relies upon the statistical 
properties of the received satellite signals, together with an 
adaptive tracking algorithm concept. More specifically, we 
proposed a scheme where the statistics of the Doppler 
frequency offset and ܥ/ ଴ܰ are monitored, as well as the 
consistency in the PVT, ephemeris and pseudorange rate, to 
detect the presence of a spoofer's signal. The tests we 
proposed are based on monitoring a moving variance of 
Doppler offset and estimated ܥ/ ଴ܰ, which essentially change 
in the presence of a spoofer, causing abrupt jumps in its 
statistics for both tests. The protection we proposed integrates 
the proposed tests in the adaptive tracking scheme in the form 
of detection and protection module, and is an integral part in 
the GNSS receiver tracking architecture. We show that by 
using the Doppler offset and ܥ/ ଴ܰ  tests, and extremely low 
probability of a false alarm of spoofing detection can be 
acheved. Once a spoofing signal is detected, the GNSS 
receiver switches to protection mode, where the tracking 
history is further used to predict the future tracking state and 
re-establish the tracking, or perform the re-acquisition. The 
proposed scheme was tested for three different spoofer types 
by simulations, and it was shown that the presence of a 
spoofer can be successfully detected. 
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